Good Chat and Good Luck

While on one of my many trips around Afghanistan, I had the opportunity to talk with a local from Kandahar city. He had a warm and welcoming persona and a quick smile. He is a clean shaven 29 year old, but he has the thick, dark five o-clock shadow common in the middle east. His black hair was well kept, parted slightly off center, with a natural wave that tapered down to clean cut sideburns. He had a solid athletic frame and stood about 5-10.

We were roommates in a open bay tent that had been partitioned into half hazard rooms using bunks, and curtains of blankets, sheets and cardboard. I was a transient, but for him, the tent was home for the foreseeable future. He was happy with the tent and noted that although it was loud with the generator right outside, it was less crowded for the same reason. After a short chat about living conditions, we transitioned to current affairs, and I was curious to hear his perspective on the looming withdrawal of US forces. I will call him Tariq, since I did not ask if I could share his story, and the fact that he has a family to protect here in Afghanistan.

Tariq had a history similar to many who fled the country during the Russian conflict and ensuing civil war. His family fled to Pakistan like so many others, however they were able to avoid the refugee camps, because they were fortunate enough to have family in Pakistan who provided them housing until they got on their financial feet. His father had died, I did not pursue the cause, but most likely he was lost in the fighting. Fortunately, his mother had three young sons to help support her, since the patriarchal society of the region provides little chance for a single mother to find work or support a family.

Another significant advantage to not ending up in refugee camps, is he also was able to get a secular education rather than a religious education in one of the many Madrasas that cater to the refugee camps. Although, some are better than others, many of the madrasas have extremist views and are breeding grounds for the foot soldiers of the Taliban and Mujaheddin. Tarig was able to go on to graduate High School, before his family returned to Kandahar in 2004, shortly after the Taliban had fallen from power. His two older brothers also finished school and even pursued advance degrees. One is now in the medical field doing well, and the other is an administrator in a cousins business, as well as keeping up his own small business with a storefront in the local Kandahar market.

Meanwhile, Tariq quickly found work with the coalition and has been working in different position across the southern provinces of Kandahar, Uruzgon and Zabul for the past eight years. In addition, he has also found time to pursue and earn his bachelors degree. Like young American soldiers thrust into role of nation building, with little exposure to theories, geo-politics, local culture, and many other factors that go into the effort, Tariq has found himself advising coalition leadership on local tribal culture and politics. 'I never liked politics or the classes in school, but now I find myself very wrapped up in it all.' he told me. Chance and circumstance has led Tariq down a road he never would have foresaw, but now he has become an adviser in the efforts to tie local tribal groups into village and district politics as well improve the relationship between provincial and national governance. He has a positive attitude and outlook and seems driven to excel in his unexpected role.

I asked him how he felt about the upcoming withdrawal and whether the country was ready. Having worked as a political adviser, I think he has picked up the habit of politically correct answers. He said, 'If the security forces show improvements and the political infrastructure improves the cooperation, communication and support between local and national governance, than I think the transition will be successful.' His answer was a major if, and I prodded him further. He acknowledged that current improvements in security are insufficient and the political infrastructure and logistical support have not been established.

I then told him that in my travels, I have found that corruption is possibly the greatest hindrance to development in a country. He agreed that this was a significant problem in Afghanistan, and as an example he talked about the presidential elections. He said the first election was probably the most fair, but the second election was decided by money and ballot box stuffing. He told me he believed the Hazari presidential candidate should be president because he was the only candidate who's votes were legitimate, not bought. This was very surprising to me, because the Hazari people are the most identifiable minority in Afghanistan, they are clustered in the mountains of Bamiyan province in the center of the country, have closer genealogical ties to Genghis Khan than most Mongols and therefore look more Asian, rather than middle eastern, and they are the only Shia people in an otherwise Sunni Afghanistan. Yet, as a Pashtu -- the majority ethnic group -- Tariq was willing to concede this fact to make his point. He further claimed that the people or rural Afghanistan do not even understand democracy or voting and most votes are cast for local tribal leaders rather than any single candidate at the national level.

He went on to tell me that Afghanistan is 'no where' right now. A country with a long history of feudalism under the Shah, or king, and loosely subordinate tribal leaders ruling smaller regions of the country. This system had it's own history of turmoil and overthrows, but over time the country of diverse tribes established national identity. As a crossroads of international trade the region has had its share of both riches passing through as well as outside interests looking to control the trade routes and region, from Alexander the Great, to Genghis Khan, to the British, and finally the Russians who led to the fall of the king and Feudal system.

The Russians brought socialism and the country began to learn and re-organize itself under this system for 10 years. This experiment failed, and the warlords that ensured it's failure then began to fight over territory and power, and civil war further broke down social structure. Next came the Taliban, who tried to create a Islamic Republic based on Sharia law. Although Islam has a significant place in the culture of the nation, the Taliban's extreme interpretation and enforcement was not popular with the majority of the population. Finally, the US and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) came in and introduce both democracy and capitalism. Again, the people of Afghanistan had to adjust to a new social structure. This recent and short history of tectonic shifts in social-political structure has left the nation somewhere in between, lost in the middle of both the physical and socio-economic rubble of instability. A melting pot of Tajiks, Hazari, Pashtu, Uzbec and other small Nomadic sub-groups has cooled and separated as the fire of nationalism has been doused by a fire hose of international influence and political theory.

As we wrapped up our conversation, I wanted to leave on a hopeful note of nationalism, despite the otherwise bleak assessment. I told him I hoped for the best for Afghanistan, and soon it would be in charge of it's own destiny. Once ISAF has left the nation would be able to establish it's own path and a true democracy of the people rather than one influence by the cultures of the international assistance force. Tariq shocked me, and rather than agreeing said, 'Those who talk of independence can go to hell. Afghanistan has been under the thumb of bigger powers for so long that it can no longer stand alone. We do not have the security forces, money or influence to be independent.' The country no longer has an infrastructure to operate independently and as the poorest nation in the world, lacks the money to build that infrastructure or to tap it's own vast mineral resources. Although I have studied the situation enough to know this sad reality, I was not expecting to hear it from Tariq. I expected the politically charged optimism he started our conversation with, and maybe some nationalistic pride in the possibilities of self-determination. Instead, I got a dose of a reality many Afghans recognize, and lived with during the lean years of civil conflict in the nineties, after the international interest and funding for the proxy battles of the cold war era had dried up.

Sadly, I think the last ten plus years of international effort may still prove fruitless as we move into the endgame. Already the timeline has been set for all coalition forces to be out by 2014 and only a small US contingent of 10,000 slated to remain. In addition, the combat role would end at the end of this year, with a complete transition to an advise and assist role. With the recent increase in attacks on coalition forces by their Afghan partner force personnel, this position also seems tenuous. Especially after the last week of multiple attacks by Afghan Security Forces in retaliation for the Quran burning, which killed six US Soldiers and wounded several more. Already, this paints a bleak picture for Tariq's big 'if' for the improvement of the security situation, but wait it gets worse.

In addition to the draw down of coalition forces, the US also plans to draw down Afghan security forces. At a time when we plan to transition to an advise and assist role, one would assume the opposite would be the case. However, since the US is footing the bill to pay the Afghan forces, the force of 352,000, at a cost of 11.2 billion a year is going to be cut to 230,000 by 2014, in order to save the US taxpayer seven billion dollars. This means that in less than two years, the combined coalition/Afghan security footprint of half a million will be cut to 240,000 in the next two years. To further hinder the possibility of success, what was a 30/70 mix of coalition to Afghan forces will drop to only 5 percent coalition, which will no longer be in a security role. Also lost, but often overlooked is the vast logistical support network the coalition established. What will remain to secure the country is a young Afghan force with limited training and an under developed supply/support backbone. Meanwhile, 120,000 of their counterparts, with the same coalition provided military skill sets, will be unemployed and looking for a way to put food on the table.

Although the two theaters have there differences, security concerns are the same in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, one of the biggest contributors to the insurgency was Paul Bremer's decision to disband all military and police forces, because they were Saddam loyalists as part of the Ba'ath party. This left the predominantly Sunni military and security trained personnel without a job, and ripe for recruitment into the insurgency, which is where many of them turned. This mistake was remedied during 'the surge' period at the end of the conflict by creating the Sunni Awakening, a local security force initiative in the Sunni regions of the country. The Sunni Awakening effort gave the locals not only an alternative to working for the insurgency, but support in countering that insurgency that also allowed them to put bread on the table.

Now we find ourselves repeating 'the surge' in Afghanistan, but rather than increasing security forces, we plan to put them out of work. Furthermore, we have laid out all these plans AHEAD OF negotiations with the Taliban. Rather than entering negotiations from a position of power with time on our sides, we have entered them with a short time horizon, and well publicized, rapidly dwindling presence and influence. The situation gives the Taliban a significant advantage going into the peace talks, and this will likely be amplified by the support they receive from Pakistan. At the end of the day, Pakistan supported the Taliban rise, supported their key leader's with drawl from Afghanistan in 2003, (even coordinating with the US to fly ISI and Taliban forces out of Konduz as US/Northern Alliance Forces surrounded them), continues to support them in exile, and will most likely support their return to power.

The only hope is that the Taliban returns as a political power within the existing political system, rather than attempting to overthrow it, as they did the war lords in the 1990's. I suspect that will be the option our negotiations will pursue. Unfortunately, we have laid out little incentive or pressure to help influence the direction the Taliban chooses to follow. In the end, the negotiations may server little more purpose beyond providing a political exit for the coalition.

I do wish the best for both the country and the people like Tariq. I wonder where he will be in another ten or twenty years. Despite his close ties to both the coalition forces and the efforts to establish a self sustaining nation and government, I wonder if he will stay and continue his work to help build the nation, or will he grow frustrated and seek better employment and opportunities abroad? He already expresses concerns about returning to Pakistan, and avoids returning even now, since the ISI likely knows he's working with coalition forces.

Will he feel the international forces failed to support the nation as it rebuilt, or will he feel the Afghan people and government wasted the aid and effort away with tribal squabbles and struggles for power? Time will tell, but as international patience and interest wain, I doubt many will be listening when it is finally told, nor do I know if I will ever meet Tariq again. So much for the hopeful close to our conversation or this topic. I guess the best I can honestly muster is good chat and good luck my friend.

Want to read more? These are some well written pieces that expand on force reduction and negotiations with the Taliban:
http://articles.philly.com/2012-01-12/news/30620318_1_taliban-talks-qatar-office-taliban-faction
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/24/opinion/la-oe-boot-afghanistan-20120224